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Intended Use of Proceeds, Underwriter Quality and 
the Long-Run Performance of SEOs in the UK 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract: We document that prospectus disclosure of (i) the motives for a seasoned equity 
offering and (ii) the choice of the underwriter explain the long-run performance of equity issuers 
in the UK. Firms citing investment needs show no abnormal performance after the offering and 
have higher investment rates post-issue compared to the period before the offering. Issuers that 
state general corporate purposes and recapitalisation motives underperform, have similar 
investment rates pre- and post-issue, and their leverage tends to increase after the offering. 
Further, consistent with the certifying role of underwriters, equity issues underwritten by high-
quality brokers show no evidence of post-issue abnormal returns, but offerings taken public by 
low-quality underwriters exhibit negative abnormal performance. Together, our results document 
a significant role prospectus information on the intended use of offering proceeds and on the 
underwriter play in predicting issuers post-offering performance in the UK. 
 
Keywords: Seasoned equity offerings, post-issue underperformance, use of proceeds, 
underwriter quality 
JEL classification: G2, G14, G32 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A vast body of literature documents that seasoned equity offering firms (SEOs) underperform 
over three to five years after the issue.1 However, little is known about how prospectus 
information on the issue motive and the choice of the underwriter help investors predict SEO 
post-issue performance, particularly outside the US market. This lack of evidence is surprising 
considering that investors are likely to closely scrutinize prospectus information to judge how the 
firm intends to use the proceeds since the issuer’s prospects depend on it. Specifically, 
prospectus information can help investors separate firms issuing equity to finance value-
increasing investment projects from market-timers that experience disappointing post-offering 
returns.  
Using a large sample of UK SEOs, this study provides novel evidence that prospectus 
information on the intended use of the issue proceeds and on the underwriter predict SEO post-
offering performance. The UK setting offers a unique research laboratory to test the signalling 
effect of prospectus information. The most common equity issuance methods in the UK, such as 
rights issues, open offers and share placements, are either first directed to existing shareholders 
or target a select group of large institutional investors (Barnes and Walker, 2006; Balachandran 
et al., 2013). Thus, in the UK, managers have less incentives to produce misleading or 
uninformative disclosure, e.g. to hide that the firm is timing the market, compared to the US 
setting where offerings to the public dominate (Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). As a result, we 
would expect prospectus information to be useful in predicting SEO post-issue performance. 
Surprisingly, Ngatuni et al. (2007, 54) report that “[L]ong-term underperformance is pervasive 
                                                          
1 Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) were the first to document SEO 
underperformance in the US. Levis (1995) provides early evidence on SEO underperformance in the UK, which 
studies by Armitage (2002), Ngatuni et al. (2007), Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) and Balachandran et al. (2013) 
corroborate. Massa et al. (2013) use a sample of 69 countries and show negative long-run returns after right 
offerings. 
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irrespective of the proposed use of funds”.2 Their evidence is puzzling and suggests prospectus 
disclosure in the UK is uninformative. It also contrasts US results in Walker and Yost (2008) and 
Autore et al. (2009), who document that prospectus information helps predict SEO post-offering 
performance. Further, reputational considerations are likely to be particularly important for UK 
underwriters as they transact repeatedly with the same group of institutional investors, 
particularly for share placements (Barnes and Walker, 2006). Yet, no study to date has examined 
if the choice of the underwriter signals SEO prospects in the UK.   
 We divide the empirical analysis into two parts. First, we examine SEO performance 
split by the intended use of proceeds (i.e., investment, recapitalisation and general corporate 
purposes) as disclosed in the offering prospectus. We predict that issuers disclosing investment 
needs signal positive NPV projects that require financing and these SEOs will not underperform 
after the offering. This prediction follows from Walker and Yost (2008) and Autore et al. (2009), 
who suggest that better post-offering performance of US SEOs that disclose investment needs is 
because these firms use proceeds to finance new value-increasing projects. We expect firms 
indicating recapitalisation and general corporate purposes to underperform. We base this 
prediction on the evidence in Hertzel and Li (2010), who argue that firms issuing equity for 
recapitalisation purposes are timing the market. Firms may also mask issues of overvalued equity 
by stating vague motives for the offering such as general corporate purposes. 
 Empirical results confirm our predictions. Firms stating investment purposes when 
issuing new equity do not underperform relative to both size, and size and book-to-market 
benchmark firms over three years subsequent to the offering. Further, these SEOs show a 185% 
                                                          
2 Contrary to our study, Ngatuni et al. (2007) focus on the comparative analysis of post-offering performance for UK 
rights and open offers. Only one table (Table 6) in their study reports SEO performance split by the intended use of 
proceeds with the analysis limited to rights issues only. We compare our study to Ngatuni et al. (2007) in detail later 
in this section.  
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increase in investment rates after the offering. These findings are consistent with these issuers 
credibly signalling their need for cash to finance new projects. SEOs reporting general corporate 
purposes and recapitalisation motives for the offering underperform. The three-year post-issue 
abnormal returns of SEOs stating general corporate purposes and recapitalisations is −9.35% and 
−45.38%, respectively, relative to size and book-to-market benchmark firms. Further, these 
SEOs have similar investment rates pre- and post-issue, and their leverage tends to increase after 
the offering. This evidence suggests an increase in the agency cost of free cash-flow after the 
offering (Jensen, 1986) and is consistent with these issuers timing offerings to periods where 
their stock is temporarily overpriced. Together, our evidence confirms that prospectus 
information on the intended use of offering proceeds helps investors identify firms with better 
post-offering prospects. 
In the second part of the study, we examine the association between underwriter quality 
and SEO long-run returns. Previous US studies argue that high-quality underwriters certify the 
issue quality and reduce moral hazard and adverse selection in the equity issue process 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Booth and Smith, 1986). Certification happens because high-
quality underwriters refrain from underwriting poor quality issues to protect their reputation. 
Reputational considerations should be particularly important for UK underwriters as they 
frequently transact with the same group of institutional investors (Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
Empirical tests confirm that underwriter reputation predicts SEO post-issue performance in the 
UK. Specifically, SEOs underwritten by high-quality brokers show no evidence of 
underperformance. Issuers sponsored by low-quality underwriters exhibit three-year post-issue 
underperformance of around −12.62% when benchmarked against firms with similar size and 
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book-to-market ratio. Our evidence suggests that high quality brokers help resolve information 
asymmetries related to the issue quality in the UK.  
Our conclusions that prospectus information on the intended use of offering proceeds and 
on the choice of the underwriter signal issuer prospects are the same when we use calendar-time 
regressions and benchmark SEO returns against the Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart 
(1997) models, the Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM, and the Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model, which includes investment and profitability factors. These results suggest that 
our conclusions are not driven by the misspecification of the normal return model (Fama, 1998). 
Further, our findings remain unchanged for subsamples split by industry, sample period and 
listing exchange (i.e., the London Main Market and the London Alternative Investment Market). 
The conclusion that underwriter quality predicts SEO performance is also robust to alternative 
measures of broker quality. Finally, using a multivariate regression framework, we confirm that 
our main conclusions persist when we control for other predictors of SEO post-issue 
performance. Multivariate regressions also show that the variation in abnormal returns due to the 
issue motive is independent of the variation due to the underwriter quality effect, in other words, 
issuers with investment motives are not systematically underwritten by high quality brokers. This 
result suggests that disclosure of both the issue motive and of the underwriter are useful to 
investors in predicting SEO post-offering performance.  
Our main tests focus on long-run SEO performance. To corroborate these tests, we also 
examine price reactions to equity issue announcements, which commonly include information on 
the issue motive and the underwriter.3 Similar to the long-run evidence, we document that 
                                                          
3 Issuers in the UK are strongly encouraged to disclose their intended use of the proceeds when they announce new 
issues. The “Guide to Listing on the London Stock Exchange”, recommends that “if a company is raising new 
capital, the use of proceeds should be clearly articulated and in line with its strategy” (‘A guide to listing on the 
London Stock Exchange’, 2010, p.22). 
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investors react more positively to SEOs that state investment needs than to issuers with other 
motives. To illustrate, the abnormal price reaction to SEOs with investment needs is 2.66% in a 
four-day window centred on the offering announcement, but −2.56% for SEOs stating 
recapitalisation needs. Multivariate regressions that control for issuer characteristics and the 
choice of the flotation method confirm the signalling role prospectus information has at the 
offering announcement.4  
This study extends and enhances the SEO literature in three critical ways. First, our paper 
adds to the fledgling international literature that examines the signalling role of the offering 
prospectus. We question the conclusion in Ngatuni et al. (2007) and report novel results on the 
association between prospectus disclosure of the issue motive and long-run SEO performance in 
the UK.5 Further, because compared to the US, the UK institutional setup more closely 
resembles that of major international equity markets, where SEOs are primarily conducted via 
methods that allow subscription by existing shareholders (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Eckbo 
and Norli, 2007; Balachandran et al., 2008, 2013), our conclusions are more likely to generalize 
to other international markets than the US evidence. This contribution is particularly important 
because the use of issuance methods that target existing shareholders has been increasing over 
time (McLean et al., 2011; Massa et al., 2013). Further, survey results in Richardson et al. (2010) 
                                                          
4 As in Armitage (2002), we do not find a significant relation between underwriter quality and price reactions to 
equity issue announcements. This result may reflect that investors are initially sceptical about the ability of 
underwriters to discriminate between high- and low-quality issues. 
5 As we explain in detail later in text, we attribute the discrepancy between our results and Ngatuni et al. (2007) to 
differences in sample selection criteria, research methods, and a longer sample period in our study, which increases 
power of our tests. Specifically, Ngatuni et al. (2007) limit their analysis to rights issues and exclude firms that delist 
before the end of the five-year event period, which leads to sample selection and survivorship bias. We do not 
impose these sample selection restrictions and include share placements, which became an important issue method 
in the UK after 1996 (Balachandran et al., 2013). Further, Ngatuni et al. (2007) focus on rights issues and their 
sample period coincides with the period where UK issuers were less likely to time rights issues to exploit stock 
overvaluation (Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011), which reduces power of their test to identify market-timers. Finally, 
Ngatuni et al. (2007) acknowledge that their use of event-time analysis only may overstate issuers’ negative 
performance, thus bias against finding that the offering prospectus discriminates between market-timers and SEOs 
with good prospects. Our study shows consistent evidence on the signalling effect of the issue motive and 
underwriter quality using event- and calendar-time methods, for subsamples and using multivariate regressions.     
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highlight that the majority of practitioners believe more international research is necessary 
because the US evidence may not generalize to other countries.  
Second, our study is the first to document the certifying role of high quality underwriters 
for new equity issues in the UK. This result highlights that even in markets dominated by right 
offerings and share placements that associate with lower information asymmetries, underwriters 
are important in resolving information asymmetries around the equity issue. The evidence that 
underwriters certify the issue quality is crucial in light of the increasing criticism of the amount 
of fees charged by investment banks for advising on share offerings in the UK.6  
Finally, our evidence on the usefulness of prospectus disclosure has important 
implications for corporate financing decisions in the UK. Previous evidence suggests that SEOs 
have disappointing returns after the offering (Levis, 1995; Armitage, 2002; Ngatuni et al., 2007; 
Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011), which can discourage listed firms from seeking equity financing in 
favour of bank lending. However, following the financial crisis, higher capital requirements led 
banks to reduce their asset size and lending, constraining loan-financed growth (Aiyar et al., 
2014; Giovannini et al., 2015). Our evidence suggests that investors pay close attention to 
prospectus information and better quality firms can signal their prospects to investors separating 
from market-timers, thus avoid potential underinvestment problem.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Levis et al. (2014) highlight that the UK government commissioned a number of reports to examine the economic 
justification for the fees charged by investment banks in the equity issue process (e.g., Underwriting of Rights 
Issues: A Study of the Returns Earned by Sub-underwriters from UK Rights Issues, Office of Fair Trading Research 
Paper No 6, 1994; Underwriting of Equity Issues -- A report by the Director General of Fair Trading, 1995; 
Underwriting of Equity Issues -- A second report by the Director General of Fair Trading, 1996;  MMC Final 
Report: Underwriting Services for Share Issues, 1999). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
2.1. Intended Use of Proceeds and the Long-run Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Balachandran et al. (2008) emphasise the role of agency 
problems and information asymmetry between management and investors in explaining SEO 
short- and long-run performance. They argue that managers may be able to influence investors’ 
expectations about future performance by the type of information they disclose to investors. 
Consistent with this proposition, Walker and Yost (2008) examine investor reaction to 
announcements of 438 equity offerings in the US, conditional on the intended use of the 
proceeds disclosed on the issuers’ registration statements (S-3 form) filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). They report that investors react more favourably to issue 
announcements for firms stating investment reasons than for firms that are vague and state 
general corporate purposes. They conclude that the intended use of the issue proceeds allows 
investors to assess the quality of the offering, and that the market perceives firms stating general 
motives for the issue as being more likely to engage in value-destroying projects. 
Autore et al. (2009) examine 880 SEOs in the US from 1997 to 2003 and divide the 
offerings into three groups: firms stating investment reasons for the issue, recapitalisation, and 
general corporate purposes. They find that issuers citing recapitalisation and general corporate 
purposes experience negative abnormal returns over three years after the issue, but issuers 
disclosing investment purposes show no evidence of underperformance. Their results suggest 
that “issuers with specific plans to use the proceeds for investment purposes are credibly 
signalling profitable investment opportunities, whereas issuers without specific investment plans 
are more likely to be opportunistic market timers” (Autore et al., 2009, p.358).  
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Contrary to the US evidence, Jeanneret (2005) documents that French SEOs that state 
investment needs for the issue underperform over a three-year period after the offering. Issuers 
intending to use proceeds to finance debt repayments do not exhibit abnormal performance. 
Jeanneret (2005, p. 101) builds on the capital structure irrelevance theory and argues that SEOs 
made for pure capital structure concerns are not informative as “adjustments in the capital 
structure are expected to have no impact on the firm value”. In contrast, issuers stating 
investment needs are “sensitive to adverse selection problems or agency conflicts and thus, they 
should be more exposed to under-reaction on the long-run”, Jeanneret (2005, p. 99). 
Ngatuni et al. (2007) examine post-offering performance for rights and open offers in the 
UK. As part of the analysis, their Table 6 reports associations between the proposed use of funds 
disclosed in the offering prospectus and issuer post-offering performance. For a sample of rights 
issues between 1986 and 1995, they find pervasive long-term underperformance irrespective of 
the proposed use of funds. Based on the previous evidence, our first set of hypotheses is: 
Hypothesis 1a: Issuers stating investment needs in the offering prospectus do not exhibit 
abnormal performance after the offering.  
Hypothesis 1b: Issuers stating recapitalisation and general corporate purposes show negative 
abnormal performance after the offering. 
 
2.2. Underwriter Quality and the Long-run Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers 
Hiring a reputable underwriter can serve as a signal of issuer quality and mitigate adverse 
selection costs inherent in the equity offering process (Slovin et al., 2000; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1994; Booth and Smith, 1986). Certification happens because high-quality 
underwriters refrain from sponsoring poor quality issues to protect their reputation. If investors 
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fail to understand the certification role of underwriters, they overpay for issues underwritten by 
low-quality brokers, which leads to post-issue underperformance. 
Previous evidence on the certification role of underwriters comes mainly from the US 
market. Michaely and Shaw (1994) and Carter et al. (1998) document that underwriter reputation 
has a positive association with long-run IPOs returns. McLaughlin et al. (2000) use underwriter 
rankings from Carter et al. (1998) to examine the relation between underwriter quality and SEO 
post-issue performance, but find no significant association. Jo et al. (2007) revisits the evidence 
in McLaughlin et al. (2000) using a more recent SEO sample and find a significant positive 
association between underwriter quality and SEO long-run performance.  
In Japan, Suzuki and Yamada (2012) examine whether the underwriter type and the intent 
to use the proceeds to repay loans predict SEO performance. They argue that the certification 
effect is stronger when underwriters have a lending relation with the issuer. Consistent with this 
prediction, they show that issues underwritten by banks with a lending relation with the issuer 
have higher SEO announcement returns and post-issue long-run performance than those 
underwritten by investment houses. However, if an issuer discloses that the intended use of the 
issue proceeds is for recapitalisation, bank underwriters are no longer associated with higher 
announcement returns and post-issue performance, in other words, the intent to recapitalise 
offsets the bank certification effect. 
In the UK, Goergen et al. (2007) find no association between underwriter reputation and 
post-issue IPO long-run returns. Armitage (2002) examine the underwriter certification role for 
UK rights issues and open offers, but find no evidence that offerings underwritten by high-
quality brokers elicit significantly more positive price reaction at the issue announcement. To 
date, no study has examined how underwriter quality affects SEO post-issue performance in the 
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UK. Given the increasing criticism of the high level of fees charged by investment banks for 
advising on share issues in the UK (Levis et al. 2014), it is important to understand the role 
underwriters play in the offering process. Thus, our second set of hypotheses is: 
Hypothesis 2a: Issues underwritten by high quality brokers show no evidence of abnormal 
performance after the offering.  
Hypothesis 2b: Issues underwritten by low quality brokers exhibit negative abnormal 
performance after the offering.  
 
3. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
We use the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New Issues Database to collect the sample 
of firms listed on the Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London 
Stock Exchange that issued seasoned equity between January 1994 and December 2007.7 We 
select offerings of either primary shares or combinations of primary and secondary shares. We 
exclude firms where either the intended use of proceeds is not available on the offering 
prospectus or that state both recapitalisation and investment purposes. Following Lyon et al. 
(1999), we exclude seasoned offerings by the same firm that occurred during the three-year post-
issue period of the previous offering.8 Finally, we exclude offerings for which monthly returns, 
the book-to-market ratio and the market value of equity were not available on Datastream.9 The 
                                                          
7 We stop in 2007 as equity issues during the financial crisis where driven by unique market conditions and liquidity 
drought that forced firms to seek liquidity from shareholders.  
8 Lyon et al. (1999) argue that overlapping of event windows for the same company creates cross-sectional 
correlation that leads to misspecified test statistics. 
9 Ince and Porter (2006) highlight the need for caution in handling return data from Datastream. Following their 
recommendations, we apply the following commonly used screens to monthly returns (e.g., Hou et al., 2011; 
Karolyi et al., 2012): (i) we define days on which more than 90% of stocks on the London Stock Exchange have 
returns equal to zero as non-trading days, (ii) we discard returns above 300% that are reversed in one month i.e., if 
both 𝑅𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡+1 are greater than 300% and (1 + 𝑅𝑡) + (1 + 𝑅𝑡+1) < 50%, then both 𝑅𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡+1 are set to 
missing, (iii) we set monthly returns to missing if the value of the total return index for the previous or the current 
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information on the lead underwriter and on the intended use of the issue proceeds is from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database, and we manually cross-checked it against offering 
prospectuses available from Perfect Information. Our main sample includes 1,678 equity 
offerings. Missing information on the lead underwriter reduces the sample to 1,546 issues when 
we consider the relation between underwriter quality and SEO performance. 
As in Autore et al. (2009), we divide the intended use of proceeds into three categories. 
Issuers with investment motives are those where proceeds are intended to finance internal and 
external growth plans such as acquisitions, project financing and product development. 
Recapitalisation motivated issues include debt repayments, refinancing of bank or fixed income 
debt, and improvement of the balance sheet. Issues with general corporate purposes include 
offerings stating that the proceeds will be used for working capital or that do not mention either 
investment or recapitalisation purposes. 
To split underwriters into high and low-quality, we follow two approaches. First, 
consistent with Abrahamson et al. (2011) and Levis et al. (2014), each year we rank all 
underwriters based on the total proceeds of SEOs underwritten in the past three years (Proceeds 
Rank). We consider the top decile of brokers as high-quality and the reminder as low-quality.10 
Second, we use data on underwriter reputation from Corwin and Schultz (2005) to identify top 
underwriters (Corwin and Schultz Rank). Their underwriter rankings include 669 investment 
banks involved in at least one IPO syndicate from 1997 to 2002 in the US and are based on the 
proportion of the offering proceeds. High-quality underwriters are those with a rank score of 1.64 
or above. This threshold matches the proportion of brokers classified as high-quality based on 
the Proceeds Rank. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
month is below 0.01 and (iv) in order to exclude any remaining outliers, monthly returns are winsorised at the 1% 
level. The screens are applied simultaneously. 
10 Our conclusions are the same when we classify the top 5% or the top 20% of brokers as high-quality. 
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Figure 1 presents the time-series distribution of SEOs split by the intended use of 
proceeds and underwriter quality. Around 15% of SEOs in the sample state recapitalisation 
purposes, 52% indicate general corporate purposes and 33% specify investment needs. These 
proportions tend to be relatively stable over time, although between 2005 and 2007, general 
corporate purposes become the dominant motive for the issue. The percentage of high-quality 
underwriters is around 10%, with an average of 11 SEOs underwritten by high-quality brokers in 
a year. 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
4. MEASURES OF SEO POST-ISSUE RETURN PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
We measure SEO post-issue performance as the stock’s buy-and-hold return (BHR):  
                                     𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=1                                     (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of firm i in month t, and T is the earlier of the three-year issue 
anniversary or the delisting date. SEO abnormal return after the offering is calculated as the buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Specifically, BHAR for an issuing firm i is calculated as the 
difference between the BHR of the issuing firm and the BHR of a benchmark firm: 
                      𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −
𝑇
𝑡=1 ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1               (2) 
where 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 is the return of the benchmark firm at time t.
11 
                                                          
11 We use BHARs, rather than cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), as the method more closely reflects investor 
experience when buying SEO stocks and holding them for three years after the issue. BHARs also avoid the 
unrealistic rebalancing assumption implicit in CARs that leads to high transaction costs (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
Kothari and Warner (1997) do not recommend using CARs since the method leads to positively biased abnormal 
returns. 
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Benchmark returns are returns of non-issuing stocks matched on (i) size and (ii) on size 
and book-to-market ratio (B/M).12 We use size and book-to-market characteristics as risk 
controls following Banz (1981), Fama and French (1993) and Lakonishok et al. (1994), who 
show that these characteristics predict future stock returns. Further, Jegadeesh (2000) argues that 
issuers tend to be small, growth companies, while non-issuers are more likely to be large and 
mature firms, which suggests that matching on size and book-to-market is more appropriate 
when comparing SEO performance with that of non-issuing stocks. Matching on size and book-
to-market also yields well-specified test statistics (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
We first match SEOs with benchmark firms on market capitalization measured at the 
fiscal year-end prior to the offering. As in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), we pair each 
issuing firm with a non-issuing counterpart based on the closest, but higher, market value of 
equity. This is because market capitalisation of SEOs is expected to increase in the post-issue 
period. If the non-issuing firm delists before the end of the three-year holding period, we use 
returns of the second benchmark firm with the closest market capitalisation for the remaining 
holding period. The eligible benchmark firms are selected from a list of non-issuing firms with a 
market value of equity within the 30% calliper of that for the issuing firm. Benchmark stocks 
include all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange excluding stocks that issued equity over 
the prior three years. For matching on size and book-to-market, we select the benchmark firm 
with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the issuing firm from the pool of non-issuing 
firms in the 30% calliper matched on size. 
To mitigate the problem of positively skewed long-term abnormal returns, we use the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic from Lyon et al. (1999) defined as 
                                                          
12 We use two normal return benchmarks to ensure our results do not reflect benchmark misspecification. Fama 
(1998) argues that misspecification of the benchmark model in event studies can produce evidence of abnormal 
performance even when it does not exist. 
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                                             𝑡𝑆𝐴 = √𝑁 (𝑆 +
1
3
𝛾𝑆2 +
1
6𝑁
𝛾)                              (3) 
where 𝑆 = 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡/𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the excess-return of equity issuers, N is the number of firms in 
the sample and 𝛾 = ∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 −
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡)
3/ 𝑁𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡)
3 is the estimate of the skewness 
coefficient. We also report the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic that tests whether 
the median abnormal return is zero. 
 
4.2. Calendar-time Analysis 
Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate the use of the calendar-time approach 
since the method is less susceptible to the “bad model” problem and it does not compound 
spurious abnormal returns.13 We use two regression models in the main analysis to test for 
abnormal SEO performance after the issue. First, we use the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model which controls for the size-effect, the book-to-market effect, and the market 
premium: 
 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝0 + 𝛽𝑚𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽ℎ𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡                (4) 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the monthly return on a portfolio of stocks that issued equity within the past three-
years and 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the risk free rate. 𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the market excess return, SMB is the average return 
on a portfolio long in small (S) and short in large (B) stocks based on their market capitalisation, 
and HML is the average return on a portfolio long in high (H) and short in low (L) book-to-
market stocks. The intercept, 𝛼𝑝0, measures the mean monthly abnormal return after the offering. 
Second, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which expands the Fama and 
French (1993) model by including a momentum factor. The model takes the form: 
                                                          
13 The disadvantage of using the calendar-time method is that the approach has lower power to detect abnormal 
performance compared to event-time analysis. Loughran and Ritter (2000) show that using Fama and French (1993) 
model captures only 50% of true abnormal returns, compared with 80% captured by BHARs with size and-book-to-
market matched firms as benchmarks. 
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𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝0 + 𝛽𝑚𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽ℎ𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑢𝑝𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝𝑡     (5) 
where 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the average return difference between portfolios of high and low momentum 
stocks.14 We use the Carhart model since Fama and French (1996) show that the three-factor 
model fails to explain the Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) momentum effect.   
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Intended Use of Proceeds and SEO Post-issue Performance 
Table 1 reports mean BHARs for three years after the issue for the pooled sample and for the 
sample stratified by the intended use of proceeds. The mean BHAR for the pooled sample is 
−10.72% when using size and B/M benchmarks (Panel A) and −21.31% when using size-
matching (Panel B), which is consistent with previous results that SEOs in the UK underperform 
after the offering (Levis, 1995; Ngatuni et al., 2007; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). 
[Table 1 here] 
We find no evidence of abnormal performance for SEOs stating investment reasons for 
the offering, but SEOs intending to use proceeds for general and recapitalisation purposes 
underperform. Specifically, mean BHAR for SEOs stating general corporate purposes is −9.35% 
using size and B/M matched stocks, and −26.03% using size matching. For SEOs indicating 
recapitalisations, the corresponding values are −45.38% and −66.36%. The evidence that SEOs 
stating recapitalisations and general purposes underperform suggests these issuers may be timing 
the offering to periods where the firm’s stock is temporarily overvalued (Autore et al., 2009; 
Hertzel and Li, 2010). 
                                                          
14 Fama and French (1993) and momentum factors for the UK are from Gregory et al. (2013). In creating the 
mimicking portfolio, Gregory et al. (2013) follow the Fama and French (1993) procedure. 
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Panels C and D report t-statistics testing the differences in BHARs across groups split by 
the intended use of the issue proceeds. On average, SEOs with investment motives outperform 
issuers stating general and recapitalisation reasons for both size and size and B/M benchmarks. 
This result suggests that firms stating investment purposes prior to the issue credibly signal better 
prospects. Further, we find a significant difference between abnormal returns for SEOs with 
general and recapitalisation needs. The evidence of more negative abnormal performance for 
SEOs with recapitalization motives is consistent with the evidence in Hertzel and Li (2010). 
Together, Table 1 results suggest that the intended use of the issue proceeds predicts SEO post-
issue performance.15 
To explain the reason for the differences in return patterns for SEOs split by the intended 
use of proceeds, Figure 2 plots mean investment-to-asset ratios and mean leverage ratios from 
one year before to three years after the offering for the three SEO groups. We follow Lyandres et 
al. (2008) and construct the investment-to-assets ratio as the sum of the annual change in 
property plant and equipment plus the annual change in inventories divided by lagged assets. 
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Issuers stating investment 
reasons show a significant increase in investment rates, with the mean investment-to-asset ratio 
increasing from 0.48 one year before the offering to 2.34 in the issue year. This evidence is 
consistent with these firms using issue proceeds to finance new projects. Investment rates for the 
other two SEO categories do not show significant changes before and after the offering. Issuers 
stating recapitalisation purposes temporarily reduce leverage from 1.67 before the issue to 0.57 
in the issue year. However, they subsequently increase their gearing. Similarly, SEOs stating 
general motives increase their leverage after the issue. Higher leverage and no evidence that cash 
is spent to finance new projects suggests more sever agency costs of free cash-flow for these 
                                                          
15 In unreported tests we find that our conclusions are unchanged when we use a five-year post-offering period. 
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issuers (Jensen, 1986). In sum, the evidence in Table 1 and Figure 2 suggests that issuers stating 
recapitalisation and general corporate purposes are likely to be timing the market, which explains 
their subsequent poor return performance.  
[Figure 2 here] 
 
5.2. Underwriter Quality and SEO Post-issue Performance 
Table 2 reports post-issue abnormal performance for issuers with high and low-quality 
underwriters. The split into high and low-quality underwriters is based on total proceeds of SEOs 
underwritten in the past 3 years, Proceeds Rank, and using broker quality ranks from Corwin and 
Schultz’s (2005), Corwin and Schultz Rank.16 Panel A measures abnormal performance relative 
to size and B/M benchmark stocks. We find no evidence that SEOs underwritten by high-quality 
brokers underperform after the issue independently of the measure of broker quality we use. In 
contrast, SEOs underwritten by low-quality brokers show negative abnormal returns of −12.62% 
over the three-year post-issue period when we use Proceeds Rank and −11.58% for Corwin and 
Schultz Rank. Panel B repeats the analysis from Panel A for size-matched benchmark stocks and 
produces similar conclusions. Panels C and D confirm that the differences in mean BHARs for 
SEOs underwritten by high vs. low-quality brokers are significant for all normal return 
benchmarks and for all measures of underwriter quality. Together, Table 2 results confirm that 
underwriter quality signals future SEO performance in the UK. 
[Table 2 here] 
                                                          
16 In unreported results, we find that our conclusions are unchanged when we use Jay Ritter’s underwriter reputation 
rankings available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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5.3. Sensitivity analysis 
In sensitivity tests, we first show that the evidence of no significant underperformance of equity 
issuers that state investment needs and of SEOs underwritten by high-quality brokers persists 
when we use calendar-time analysis. Second, we show that our conclusions are unaffected when 
we split SEOs by industry, sample period, and the listing exchange (i.e., the London Main 
Market and the London Alternative Market). Third, we report that our conclusions are not due to 
the choice of the normal return benchmark. Specifically, we show that our conclusions do not 
change when we use the liquidity-augmented CAPM (Liu, 2006) or the five-factor model of 
Fama and French (2015) which includes an investment and a profitability factor. 
Table 3 documents that our conclusions from event-time analysis persist when we use 
calendar-time regressions.17 Panel A reports results for the pooled sample and when we split 
SEOs by their intended use of proceeds. The mean monthly abnormal performance for the 
pooled sample is −0.70% for the Fama and French (1993) model and −0.63% for the Carhart 
(1997) model, which is economically significant and comparable with the estimates from the 
event-time analysis in Table 1. Splitting SEOs by the intended use of proceeds, we do not find 
evidence of SEO underperformance for firms indicating investment motive for the offering. 
SEOs stating general and recapitalisation uses underperform when we use both the three- and the 
four-factor models.  
Panel B examines if our conclusions on the positive relation between broker quality and 
SEO post-issue performance persist when we use calendar-time regressions. Using the Fama and 
French (1993) model, we continue to find no evidence of underperformance by SEOs sponsored 
by high-quality brokers. However, SEOs underwritten by low-quality brokers underperform.  
                                                          
17 For brevity, Table 3 reports only Jensen’s alphas. The full table including factor loadings is available from the 
authors. 
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Panel C reports Jensen alphas for SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds and 
underwriter quality when we use the Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM and the Fama and 
French’s (2015) five-factor model as normal return benchmarks. Bilinski et al. (2012) use the 
liquidity-augmented CAPM to evaluate the long-run performance of US SEOs, and Capstaff and 
Fletcher (2011) use it to evaluate the performance of UK offerings. Nichol and Dowling (2014) 
examine the performance of the five-factor model in the UK and conclude that it offers “a 
marginal improvement over the widely used FF3 [Fama and French (1993) three-factor model]”. 
We discuss the two models in Appendix A. We consider these models because the Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models may not be well-specified in the UK (Gregory et al., 
2013; Michou et al., 2014). 
Our conclusions are unchanged when we use the Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented 
CAPM or the Fama and French’s (2015) five-factor model. Specifically, we continue to find that 
SEOs stating recapitalisation and general corporate purposes underperform after the offering, but 
there is no evidence of abnormal performance for issuers stating investment needs. SEOs 
sponsored by high-quality brokers do not underperform, but offerings underwritten by low-
quality brokers show significant negative abnormal performance.18 Together, Table 3 results 
confirm that our conclusions are not sensitive to the way we calculate abnormal returns. 
[Table 3 here] 
In unreported results, we also examine if our conclusions do not change when we repeat 
the analysis for subsamples.19 First, splitting issuers into five industries using the issuer’s SIC 
                                                          
18 In unreported results we find that our conclusions are also unchanged when we use (i) a four-factor model which 
includes the Fama and French (1993) factors and the liquidity factor; (ii) a five-factor model that consists of the 
Carhart (1997) model augmented by a liquidity factor; (iii) a four-factor model by Hou et al. (2015) that excludes 
the HML factor from the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Thus, our conclusions are not sensitive to the 
specification of the benchmark model.   
19 Subsample results are available from the authors upon request.  
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code and Kenneth French’s industry classification, we continue to find that SEOs stating 
investment purposes do not underperform after the offering, but issuers stating recapitalisation 
and general purposes show on average significant and negative abnormal performance after the 
issue. These results confirm that our conclusions from Table 1 are not driven by industry effects. 
Second, the conclusions are unchanged when we examine SEO performance for sub-periods 
1994–2000 and 2001–2007. This test confirms that our results are not confined to specific sub-
periods. Third, our results remain the same when we examine post-issue performance for SEOs 
listed on the London Main Market and the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM). 
Fourth, we document that SEOs underwritten by high-quality brokers do not underperform in 
any industry, subperiod or listing exchange. This is different from performance of SEOs 
underwritten by low-quality brokers which consistently underperform. This result confirms that 
our conclusion on the certifying role of underwriters is not driven by differences in industry 
composition, the choice of the sample period, or the listing exchange for high compared to low-
quality brokers. In sum, sensitivity tests support our conclusion on the signalling role of the 
prospectus information on the intended use of the issue proceeds and underwriter quality.  
 
  
5.4. Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
 
Next, we examine if the signalling effects of the intended use of the issue proceeds and of the 
underwriter quality (i) persist when we control for other predictors of SEO post-issue 
performance and (ii) whether the two effects are independent. The first test responds to the 
criticism of the matching procedure in Bessembinder and Zhang (2013). They argue that 
although matching on firm size and B/M ratio is standard in the SEO literature, issuers are not 
necessarily well-matched on other relevant characteristics which can confound inferences. The 
second test examines if the evidence that SEOs underwritten by high-quality underwriters do not 
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underperform is not simply due to the fact that high-quality underwriters sponsor on average a 
larger proportion of SEOs stating investment purposes which, as we show, do not underperform 
after the offering. 
To examine the two questions, we use the following multivariate regression model where 
the dependent variable is the size and-book-to-market matched BHAR for a three-year post-issue 
period:  
    𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (6) 
and 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm states investment 
purposes for the issue, and 0 otherwise. 𝐺𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the intended use of proceeds is for general corporate purposes, and 0 otherwise. To account for 
underwriter quality we include an indicator variable, 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡 that takes a value of 1 if 
the equity issue has been underwritten by a high-quality underwriter, and 0 otherwise based on 
Proceeds Rank.20 
The set of controls in vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in model (6) include: (i) firm size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡), to control for 
lower expected returns of smaller firms (Banz, 1981); (ii) the book-to-market ratio (𝐵/𝑀𝑖𝑡) and 
the investment-to-assets ratio (𝐼𝑁𝑉/𝐴𝑖𝑡) to capture firms growth opportunities and investment 
needs, respectively; (iii) firm age at the equity issue (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡), as younger firms typically need 
more external capital to finance their investments than mature firms and may face higher 
information asymmetries compared to firms with long history of financial information available 
to investors (Bilinski and Mohamed, 2014); (iv) leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡), defined as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets as highly geared firms may use issue proceeds to lower their 
leverage (Eckbo et al., 2000); (v) return-on-assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) which measures the marginal benefit 
                                                          
20 Our conclusions remain the same when using the Corwin and Schultz’s (2005) broker quality ranks to define 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡 . 
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of an investment (Chen and Zhang, 2010); intuitively, given a firm’s discount rate, high 
profitability means high net present value of new projects, which stimulates new investment. 
Equation (6) also includes (vi) stock liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), which is Liu’s (2006) LM12 
measure as Eckbo et al. (2000) suggest that equity issues may improve stock’s liquidity and 
reduce the firm’s expected returns; (vii) momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡) which is the pre-issue stock 
price performance measured as the six-month abnormal return before the offering and controls 
for potential stock overvaluation; (viii) issue proceeds, (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡), as larger offerings may 
indicate attempts to time the market. Finally, we include the choice of the flotation method since 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Balachandran et al. (2008, 2013) document that the choice of the 
equity issue method can signal issuer quality. Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) document that rights 
offerings in the UK perform better after the issue compared to other floatation methods and 
Balachandran et al. (2013) indicate that firms issuing to (internal) external shareholders (do not) 
experience long-term underperformance. To control for this effect, we include an indicator 
variable 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 that takes a value of 1 for rights issues and 0 otherwise, and an indicator 
variable 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 that is 1 for issue placements and 0 otherwise. Equation (6) also includes 
year and industry fixed-effects. Issue proceeds are from the SDC database and other explanatory 
variables are from Datastream and measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the offering. 
 Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for variables in equation (6). Due to higher data 
requirements, our sample for the cross-sectional regression reduces to 1,092 SEOs. The mean 
market value of an SEO firm is £485m, which is comparable with past UK studies (e.g., Ngatuni 
et al., 2007 and Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). The mean B/M ratio is 0.611 and the investment-
to-asset ratio is 0.113. On average, a firm has been listed on the exchange for close to 11 years 
and the mean leverage is 0.513. The average return-on-assets is −16.2%, and the mean number of 
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volume-adjusted zero-trading days is close to 21. Pre-issue share price run-up is on average 
23.8%, consistent with the earlier evidence that issuers experience strong price run-ups prior to 
the offering (Loughran and Ritter, 2000). On average SEOs raise £68m in proceeds and the 
dominant issue method is stock placement (45.4%), which is consistent with the evidence in 
Balachandran et al. (2013) that this method became the most common SEO form in the UK after 
1996. Rights issues make up 18.9% of the sample. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates for equation (6). t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm and year 
clustering. We use double-clustering since the residuals may be correlated across firms and over 
time.21 Column Model (1) includes only the indicator variables for the intended use of the 
proceeds (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 and 𝐺𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡) and for high underwriter quality (𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡). Model 
(2) also includes the indicator variable for the choice of the issue method. Model (3) includes the 
full specification of equation (6). For all model specifications, we find significant coefficients on 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 and 𝐺𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡, which confirms the prediction that the intended use of proceeds as 
stated in the prospectus predicts SEO long-term post-issue performance. Further, the coefficient 
on 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡 is positive and significant for all specifications, which confirms that issues 
underwritten by high-quality brokers have superior post-issue performance. Since the indicator 
variable for underwriter quality and the dummy variables for the purpose of the issue are all 
significant, the regressions confirm that the underwriter effect is independent of the issue motive 
effect.  For Model (3), we also document that more profitable firms and more liquid stocks have 
                                                          
21 In unreported results, we also followed Cameron et al. (2011) and re-estimated equation (6) with double-clustered 
standard errors bootstrapped for the time-series dimension (year) using the Wild bootstrap methodology. Our 
conclusions do not change when using this procedure. 
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higher post-issue returns. Overall, regression results confirm that the prospectus disclosure of the 
motives for a seasoned equity offering and the choice of high-quality underwriters explain long-
run performance of equity issuers in the UK. 22 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 
5.5. Price Reactions to Equity Issue Announcements 
To provide corroborating evidence that prospectus information helps investors distinguish SEOs 
with better post-offering prospects, we also examine price reactions to equity issue 
announcements. Short-horizon tests are largely immune to the misspecification of the normal 
return model (Kothari and Warner, 2008), which means that the conclusions from price reaction 
tests cannot be attributed to the “bad model” problem.  
Consistent with the long-horizon evidence, we expect to find more positive price 
reactions to equity issues announcements stating investment purposes compared to offerings with 
general and recapitalization needs. Table 6 reports cumulative, market-adjusted abnormal returns 
(CARs) around equity issue announcements across various event windows starting two days 
before the announcement and ending two days after. Panel A reports price reactions for SEOs 
split by the issue motive. For all event windows, we observe a significant positive price reaction 
to equity announcements motivated by investment needs, but a negative price reaction where 
firms state recapitalization purposes. To illustrate, an average five-day CAR centred on the 
announcement day is 2.66% for issues stating investment needs, but −2.56% for issues citing 
recapitalization motives. SEOs with general corporate purposes have zero price reactions.  
Panel B documents no significant association between broker quality and price reactions 
to issue announcements, which is similar to results in Armitage (2002). Given our long-run 
                                                          
22 Our conclusions are similar using BHARs with benchmark firms matched on size only and when using BHARs 
calculated over five-years after the offering. 
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evidence that SEOs sponsored by high quality brokers do not underperform, short-horizon results 
may reflect that investors are initially sceptical about ability of underwriters to discriminate 
between high and low-quality issuers. Together, Table 6 evidence confirms our earlier result that 
SEOs stating investment needs are of better quality compared to the remaining SEO groups as 
investors react more positively to these offering announcements. Investors recognise that SEOs 
stating recapitalisation motives are likely to have poor future performance (as these firms suffer 
more from agency cost of free cash flow after the offering) and discount those SEOs more 
strongly at the issue announcement. 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Next, we repeat equation (6) where the dependent variable is the price reaction to equity 
issue announcements. The model has the form: 
   𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,2)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (7) 
where the set of controls in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the same as in model (6). Equation (7) tests if differences in 
price reactions to equity issues announcements in Table 6 are not due to differences in 
characteristics of issuing firms or the choice of the flotation method.  
Table 7 reports regression results for equation (7). We continue to find that investors react 
more positively to equity issue announcements where the firm states investment and general 
corporate purposes compared to firms indicating recapitalisation needs. This result is consistent 
with long-horizon evidence from Table 5.23 We do not find significant associations between 
                                                          
23 Table 7 results also address possible timing of “good” vs. “bad” news releases related to the SEO event that could 
explain our long-run results. Specifically, managers may release “good” news about positive NPV projects before 
the SEO announcement, which means that the SEO event itself is largely anticipated and associates with no 
significant short- or long-run abnormal returns. In contrast, managers may delay “bad” news that associate with 
issues motivated by general corporate purpose or recapitalization needs, which means that the SEO announcement 
associates with “new” negative information. Our evidence on positive price reactions to SEOs announcements for 
firms stating investment purpose suggests that timing of “good” vs. “bad” news releases is unlikely to explain our 
main results.  
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underwriter quality and price reactions to equity issue announcements. Together, short-term 
price reaction results corroborate our main findings, namely that prospectus information on the 
intended use of offering proceeds helps investors identify SEOs with better prospects.  
[Table 7 here] 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This study documents that investors can use information from the equity offering prospectus on 
the intended use of issue proceeds and on the underwriter to predict SEO post-issue performance 
in the UK. We find that SEOs stating investment purposes do not exhibit abnormal performance 
after the offering, while SEOs intending to use the proceeds for general and recapitalisation 
purposes underperform. In addition, we document a positive relation between underwriter quality 
and SEO post-issue performance in the UK: offerings sponsored by high-quality brokers show 
no evidence of abnormal performance, but issues underwritten by low-quality underwriters 
underperform. Our conclusions are robust to alternative measures of abnormal returns and of 
underwriter quality, calendar-time regressions, subsamples split on industry, sample period and 
exchange of listing, multivariate regressions that control for other predictors of SEO post-issue 
performance, and when we focus on price reactions to equity issue announcements. Further, we 
show that the variation in abnormal returns attributed to the issue motive is independent of the 
variation due to the underwriter quality effect. Together, the results suggest that prospectus 
information on the intended use of proceeds and on the underwriter helps investors identify 
stocks with better post-issue prospects.  
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APPENDIX A 
This section discusses the Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM and the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model that we use to examine SEO performance in Table 3. The Liu’s (2006) 
liquidity-augmented CAPM consists of the market factor and a liquidity risk factor  
                                 𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝0 + 𝛽𝑚𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑟𝑝𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡                                 (8) 
where 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 is the difference between the return on a low liquidity portfolio and the return on a 
high liquidity portfolio. Liu (2006) argues that the liquidity-augmented CAPM should exclude 
the SMB and HML factors because distress risk proxied by these two factors is a source of stock 
illiquidity i.e., liquidity risk should directly capture distress risk. Liu (2006) shows that the 
liquidity-augmented CAPM explains market anomalies associated with size, book-to-market, 
cash-flow-to-price, earnings-to-price, dividend yield, and long-term contrarian investment.  
The liquidity factor is constructed based on Liu’s (2006) LM12 measure defined as the 
turnover-adjusted number of zero-trading days: 
     𝐿𝑀12 =  (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 +
1
𝑇𝑅12𝑖
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
) ∗ (
252
𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷
)               (9) 
where TR12 is the sum of daily turnovers in the previous 12 months (expressed in percentage), 
NoTD is the total number of trading days over the past 12 months, and the deflator is chosen to 
be 20,000 to ensure (1/𝑇𝑅12 )/𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 < 1. Liu (2006,2010) argues that LM12 captures 
multiple liquidity dimensions and generates a more robust liquidity premium than bid-ask 
spreads, Hasbrouck’s c, the number of zero daily returns, stock turnover, and return-to-volume.  
The liquidity risk factor, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡, is then constructed on a monthly basis where we rank all 
stocks at the end of month t-1 based on their market value and LM12. Specifically, we first 
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classify all stocks as either large (B) or small (S) according to their respective market 
capitalisation. Then, the bottom 30% of stocks based on LM12 are classified as high liquidity 
(HL) and the highest 30% as low liquidity (LL).24  The liquidity factor is then defined as the 
monthly profits from buying one dollar of small, low liquidity stocks (SLL) and large, low 
liquidity stocks (BLL) and selling one dollar of  small, high liquidity stocks (SHL) and large, high 
liquidity stocks (BHL) i.e.,  𝐿𝐼𝑄 =
1
2
(𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐿𝐿) −
1
2
(𝑆𝐻𝐿 + 𝐵𝐻𝐿). 
Fama and French (2015) propose a five-factor model to capture the cross-section of stock 
returns. The model includes the Fama and French (1993) factors described in equation (4) and a 
profitability and an investment factor. The model takes the form: 
   𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝0 + 𝛽𝑚𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽ℎ𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽𝑏𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝𝑡     (10) 
where INV and PROF represent stock portfolios with conservative minus aggressive investments 
and robust minus weak profitability, respectively. Investment is calculated as the percentage 
annual change in total assets (i.e., change in total assets from the fiscal year ending in year t-2 to 
the fiscal year ending in t-1, divided by t-2 total assets) and profitability is defined as the annual 
change in operating profit given a firm’s book equity for the fiscal year ending in year t-1.  
The profitability and investment factors are constructed by forming portfolios based on 
two independent sorts per calendar year: there are two size groups (breakpoint of 50%) and three 
groups based on either profitability or investment (breakpoints of 30% and 70%). In detail, we 
first classify all stocks as either large (B) or small (S) based on their market capitalisation. Then, 
we classify the top 30% of stocks as high profitability (HP) and high investment (HI), and the 
                                                          
24 We use yearly-rebalanced FTSE350 constituents to construct the portfolios. Gregory et al. (2013) and Nichol and 
Dowling (2014) argue that this approach captures the investment opportunity set of institutional and international 
investors. In order to ensure consistency with the Gregory et al.’s (2013) construction of the SMB, HML and MOM 
factors, financial stocks and stocks with negative or missing book values are excluded from the sample. 
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bottom 30% of stocks are classified as low profitability (LP) and low investment (LI).25  The 
profitability factor is then defined as 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹 =
1
2
(𝑆𝐻𝑃 + 𝐵𝐻𝑃) −
1
2
(𝑆𝐿𝑃 + 𝐵𝐿𝑃). The 
investment factor is defined as 𝐼𝑁𝑉 =
1
2
(𝑆𝐿𝐼 + 𝐵𝐿𝐼) −
1
2
(𝑆𝐻𝐼 + 𝐵𝐻𝐼). As before, we use 
yearly-rebalanced FTSE350 constituents to construct the portfolios while excluding financial 
stocks and stocks with negative or missing book values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 In Fama and French (2015), the HP (high-profitability) and LP (low-profitability) portfolios are respectively 
denoted “robust” and “weak” profitability portfolios, while the the LI (low-investment) and HI (high-investment) 
portfolios are denoted “conservative” and “aggressive” investment portfolios. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the sample of UK SEOs over time 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure reports the annual distribution of SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds and 
underwriter quality. The sample comprises 1,678 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) of common stock by 
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1994−2007. The sample reduces to 1,546 
observations due to missing information on the lead underwriter. 
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Figure 2 
Investment and leverage before and after the equity issue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure reports mean leverage and investment-to-assets ratio 12 months before the issue, in the issue 
month, and 12, 24 and 36 months after the offering. The ratios are reported for SEOs split by the intended use of 
proceeds (1,678 offerings over the period 1994−2007). The investment-to-assets ratio is the sum of the annual 
change in property plant and equipment with the annual change in inventories divided by lagged asset value. 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
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Table 1 
Long-Run SEO Performance and the Intended Use of the Issue Proceeds 
 
  
Mean  SA Wilcoxon 
  N  BHAR t-statistic test 
Panel A: BHAR (%) matched on size and book-to market 
   All issuers 1678 −10.72% −2.715*** −102114*** 
   Recapitalisation 247  −45.38% −4.610***     −6669*** 
   General Corporate Purposes 873   −9.35%  −2.467***   −32303*** 
   Investment  558     3.13% 0.394       2369 
Panel B: BHAR (%) matched on size 
    
   All issuers 1678 −21.31%    −5.245***                                  −197953***
   Recapitalisation 247 −66.36%    −7.404***     −9689*** 
   General Corporate Purposes 873  −26.03%    −6.554***                                  −68391***
   Investment 558     6.24% 0.867  951 
Panel C: Differences in mean BHARs matched on size and book to-market 
   Investment > General Corporate Purposes 
  
t=1.390* 
 
   Investment > Recapitalisation 
  
t=3.801*** 
 
   General Corporate Purposes > Recapitalisation  
  
t=3.421*** 
 
Panel D: Differences in mean BHARs matched on size 
  Investment >  General Corporate Purposes 
  
t= 3.742*** 
 
  Investment > Recapitalisation 
  
t= 6.081*** 
 
  General Corporate Purposes  > Recapitalisation     t= 3.984***   
 
Note: The table reports mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Mean BHAR) of issuers relative to matched non-issuing 
firms for three years after the offering. The sample size is 1,678 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) of common stock by 
UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2007. The first rows in Panels A and B show BHARs for 
the pooled sample and subsequent rows report BHARs for SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds: general 
corporate purposes, investment and recapitalisation. Panels C and D report t-tests for the differences in mean BHARs 
from Panels A and B. SA t-statistic is the two-sided skewness-adjusted t-statistic and Wilcoxon test is the W-statistic of 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. N is the number of issues. *, ** and *** designate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Long-Run SEO Stock Performance by Underwriter Quality 
  
 
Mean  SA Wilcoxon 
  N  BHAR  t-statistic test 
Panel A: BHAR (%) matched on Size-and-BM         
 High-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 144 9.47% 1.020 351 
 High-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 150 −0.76% −0.112 −346 
 Low-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 1402 −12.62% −2.776*** −79610*** 
 Low-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 1396 −11.58% −2.543**                                   −72343***
Panel B: BHAR (%) matched on Size 
    
 High-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 144 −3.61% −0.415 −473 
 High-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 150 −4.80% −0.660 −796* 
 Low-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 1402 −24.70% −5.307*** −151541*** 
 Low-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 1396 −24.68% −5.267*** −146311*** 
 Panel C: Differences in mean BHARs (matched on Size-and-BM) 
   
 High-quality > Low-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 
  
t=2.200** 
 
 High-quality > Low-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 
 
t=1.357* 
 
 Panel D: Differences in mean BHARs (matched on Size) 
   
 High-quality > Low-quality Underwriter (Proceeds Rank) 
  
t=2.207** 
 
 High-quality > Low-quality Underwriter (Corwin and Schultz Rank) 
  
  t=2.438***   
 
Note: The table reports long-run SEO performance for issues underwritten by high and low-quality underwriters. The 
sample includes 1,546 issues with non-missing information on the lead underwriter. The sample is split into SEOs 
associated with high-quality and low-quality underwriters based on (i) Proceeds Rank and (ii) on underwriter reputation 
rankings from Corwin and Schultz (2005) with a threshold of 1.64 (i.e., high-quality underwriters have a rank score of 
1.64 or above). Panel A reports three-year mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of issuing firms relative to 
size and book-to-market matched non-issuing firms. Panel B reports mean three-year BHARs relative to size-matched 
non-issuing firms. Panels C and D report t-tests for the difference in BHARs for issues associated with low and high-
quality underwriters reported in Panels A and B, respectively. SA t-statistic is the two-sided skewness-adjusted t-
statistic. Wilcoxon test is the W-statistic of the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. N is the number of equity 
issues. *, ** and *** designate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Calendar-Time Regressions for SEOs Split by the Intended Use of Proceeds and Underwriter Quality 
      All Issuers (N=1678) Recapitalisation (N =247) General Corporate Purposes (N =873)     Investment (N =558) 
   FF3FM   C4FM  FF3FM  C4FM         FF3FM  C4FM FF3FM  C4FM 
Panel A: Calendar-Time Regressions for SEOs Split by the Intended Use of Proceeds 
   Alpha −0.70%*** −0.63%*** −1.16%*** −1.08%** −1.01%*** −0.93%*** 0.00% 0.05% 
   p (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
Panel B: Calendar-Time Regressions for SEOs Split by Underwriter Quality 
 
High-Quality Underwriters High-Quality Underwriters Low-Quality Underwriters Low-Quality Underwriters 
 
(Proceeds Rank, N=144) (Corwin Rank, N =150) (Proceeds Rank, N =1402) (Corwin Rank, N =1396) 
   FF3FM   C4FM  FF3FM  C4FM   FF3FM  C4FM FF3FM  C4FM 
   Alpha −0.31% −0.04% −0.34% −0.16% −0.73%*** −0.68%*** −0.81%*** −0.73%*** 
   p (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
Panel C: Calendar-Time Regressions using Alternative Return Benchmarks 
 
All Issuers Recapitalisations 
General Corporate 
Purposes 
Investment 
High-Quality 
Underwriters 
Low-Quality 
Underwriters 
  L-CAPM FF5FM L-CAPM FF5FM L-CAPM FF5FM  L-CAPM  FF5FM L-CAPM FF5FM  L-CAPM  FF5FM 
Alpha −0.66%** −0.64%*** −1.09%** −0.86%* −0.99%*** −0.91%*** 0.05% 0.00% −0.21% −0.35% −0.70%*** −0.68%*** 
p (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
Note: Panels A and B report Jensen’s alpha estimates from the calendar-time models (4) and (5), which uses the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF3FM), and the 
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model (C4FM) as the normal return benchmarks. Panel A reports results for SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds. Column All Issuers shows 
estimates for the pooled sample. Subsequent columns report results for SEOs split by the intended use of proceeds: General Corporate Purposes, Investment and Recapitalisation. 
Panel B reports results for SEOs split by the underwriter quality. We use Proceeds Rank and the underwriter reputation ranking of Corwin and Schultz (2005) with a threshold of 
1.64 to split SEOs into High-Quality and Low-Quality underwriter groups. The sample size in Panel B The sample is 1,546 issues with non-missing information on the lead 
underwriter. Panel C presents Jensen’s alpha estimates from calendar-time regressions where we use Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM (L-CAPM) and the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model (FF5FM) as normal return benchmarks. LIQ is the difference between the return on a low liquidity portfolio and the return on a high liquidity portfolio 
constructed as in Liu (2006). INV and PROF are portfolios of stocks with conservative minus aggressive investment and robust minus weak profitability, respectively, constructed as 
in Fama and French (2015). p are p-values based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. *, ** and *** designate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Regression Model 
  Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Investment 0.331 0.000 0.471 
GCP 0.522 1.000 0.500 
UnderwriterQ 0.104 0.000 0.306 
Size 485.4 29.320 3,517 
BM 0.611 0.440 0.894 
INV/A 0.113 0.010 0.353 
Age 10.79 6.000 11.45 
Leverage 0.513 0.517 0.332 
ROA −0.162 0.000 0.429 
Liquidity 20.93 1.000 41.32 
Momentum 0.238 0.063 0.968 
Proceeds 67.96 10.250 232.0 
Placements 0.454 0.000 0.498 
Rights 0.189 0.000 0.391 
 
Note:  The table reports descriptive statistics for explanatory variables in equation (6). Investment is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if companies state investment purposes for the equity issue and zero otherwise. 
GCP is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if companies state general corporate purposes and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variable UnderwriterQ takes the value of one if the lead underwriter of the SEO is a high-
quality underwriter, and zero otherwise. Size is the firm’s market value. BM is the book-to-market ratio. INV/A is 
Lyandres et al.’s (2008) investment-to-assets ratio. Age is the difference between the firms’ first listing date and the 
issue date. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. ROA is return on assets and Liquidity is the Liu’s 
(2006) stock liquidity measure LM12. Momentum is the stock’s BHAR over six months before the issue and 
captures the pre-issue price run-up. Proceeds are issue proceeds. The dummy variables Placements and Rights refer 
to issue placements and rights issues, respectively. The variables are for the fiscal year-end prior to the offerings. 
The number of observations is 1,092 offerings.  
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Table 5 
Regressions Analysis – Long-Run Post-Issue Performance 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
        
Investment 0.501*** 0.510*** 0.540*** 
 
(0.128) (0.126) (0.170) 
GCP 0.434*** 0.443*** 0.421*** 
 
(0.115) (0.114) (0.142) 
UnderwriterQ 0.238** 0.232** 0.185* 
 
(0.100) (0.099) (0.107) 
Placements 
 
0.021 −0.103 
  
(0.084) (0.099) 
Rights 
 
0.136 0.010 
  
(0.116) (0.126) 
ln(Size) 
  
−0.004 
   
(0.049) 
ln(Age) 
  
−0.072 
   
(0.047) 
BM 
  
−0.020 
   
(0.076) 
Leverage 
  
0.274 
   
(0.187) 
ROA 
  
0.293** 
   
(0.134) 
Liquidity 
  
−0.003** 
   
(0.001) 
Momentum 
  
−0.033 
   
(0.038) 
ln(Proceeds) 
  
−0.005 
   
(0.039) 
INV/A 
  
−0.087 
   
(0.104) 
Intercept −0.360** −0.442** −0.308 
  (0.173) (0.191) (0.236) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,546 1,546 1,092 
Adjusted-R² 0.030 0.030 0.029 
 
Note: The table presents results for equation (6) where the dependent variable is the three-year Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHARmonths 1-36) for SEOs compared to size and book-to-market matched non-issuing stocks.  The 
other variables are defined in Table 4. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and year and firm clustering. N denotes the number of observations. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Price Reactions to Equity Issue Announcements 
  N CAR(0,1) CAR (0,2) CAR (−1,1) CAR (−2,2) 
Panel A: Intended use of the issue proceeds 
   Recapitalisation 247 −1.90% −2.23% −2.30% −2.56% 
Z-test 
 
(−1.580)* (−1.477)* (−1.791)** (−1.552)* 
Patell test 
 
[−1900.5]** [−2281.5]** [−2424.5]** [−2821.5]*** 
   General Corporate Purposes 873 −0.07% 0.08% 0.02% 0.08% 
Z-test 
 
(−0.667) (−0.063) (−0.627) (−0.347) 
Patell test 
 
[−7615] [−7513] [−9199] [−10677]* 
   Investment  558 1.87% 2.15% 2.08% 2.66% 
Z-test 
 
(3.407)*** (3.600)*** (3.333)*** (3.586)*** 
Patell test 
 
[10073.5]*** [9121.50]*** [7954.50]** [7600.50]** 
Panel B: Underwriter Quality 
     
   High-Quality Underwriters 144 −0.02% 0.17% 0.07% 0.32% 
Z-test 
 
(0.871) (1.373)* (0.568) (0.784) 
Patell test 
 
[22.5] [344.5] [172.5] [304.5] 
   Low-Quality Underwriters 1402 −0.10% 0.00% −0.06% 0.06% 
Z-test 
 
(0.183) (0.894) (0.233) (0.923) 
Patell test   [−2684.5] [−7503.5] [−13641] [−18010] 
 
Note: The table presents cumulative, market-adjusted abnormal returns (CARs) around the equity issue 
announcement date split by the intended use of the issue proceeds (Panel A) and by underwriter quality (Panel B). In 
curve brackets, we report the Boehmer et al. (1991) standardized cross-sectional Z-test, which is an extension of the 
traditional Patell test that compensates for a possible variance increase on an event date. In square brackets, we 
report the W-statistic for the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.   
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Table 7 
Regressions Analysis - Price Reactions to Equity Issue Announcements 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Investment 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
GCP 0.026** 0.024** 0.029** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
UnderwriterQ 0.004 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Placements 
 
0.001 −0.007 
  
(0.008) (0.010) 
Rights 
 
−0.023** −0.026** 
  
(0.009) (0.011) 
ln(Size) 
  
−0.001 
   
(0.003) 
ln(Age) 
  
−0.004 
   
(0.005) 
BM 
  
0.001 
   
(0.006) 
Leverage 
  
0.009 
   
(0.017) 
ROA 
  
0.009 
   
(0.015) 
Liquidity 
  
−0.000 
   
(0.000) 
Momentum 
  
0.002 
   
(0.006) 
ln(Proceeds) 
  
0.003 
   
(0.003) 
INV/A 
  
−0.001 
   
(0.011) 
Intercept −0.043*** −0.031* −0.057** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,546 1,546 1,092 
Adjusted-R² 0.026 0.030 0.046 
 
Note: The table presents results for equation (7) where the dependent variable is the cumulative, market-adjusted 
abnormal return for a five-day window centred on the issue announcement date, CAR(−2, 2). The other variables are 
defined in Table 4. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and year and firm clustering. N denotes the number of observations. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
